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SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE
ABSTRACT
Generational selfishness is a central assumption in thevast literature
on the life cycle model. Much of this literature deals with theimpact of
alternative government policies in light of self—interestedgenerational
behavior. Surprisingly, the choices of governments invirtually all of these
analyses are assumed to be independent of the preferences of the selfish
generations these governments presumably represent. We address thisanomaly by modeling each generation as having a government thatstrictly represents its interests. Such selfish generationalgovernments will potentially distort
the economy along a number of dimensions. We consider twotypes of
inefficiencies that have received little or no attention in theliterature.
The first is the monopolization of factor supplies, and thesecond is the
under— or overprovision of durable public goods. We demonstratethat selfish
generations may place sizable marginal taxes on their factor supplies in order
to monopolize their factor markets. We also show that selfishgenerations
will provide inefficient levels of durable public goods bothat the local and
national levels. Finally, we demonstrate that generationalinefficiencies can
arise even in models of cooperative bargaining because of thefirst—mover
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In the absence of intergenerational altruism one would expect each
generation to act in its self interest vis—a—vis other generations. For
example, one would expect current generations to expropriate as much as
possible from future generations. This seems likely even if the membership of
each generation is heterogeneous, at least insofar as generational issues are
at stake.
While the selfish pursuit of generational objectives would seem the only
viable policy for a representative (of the living) government, the literature
on intergenerational fiscal policy (e.g.; Summers [1981]) has, with rare
exceptions (e.g., Kotlikoff, Persson, and Svensson (1988]), ignored this point
and modeled government as having its own arbitrary objectives. Our paper
addresses this anomaly by considering governments that are concerned solely
with their generations' interests. Specifically, we assume that each
generation has its own representative government. Each generation's
government can, within certain limits, regulate the economic affairs of its
members and bargain with other generations, but it cannot unilaterally
expropriate from other generations.
The notion of generation—specific governments may seem hard to reconcile
with observed political institutions, but the competing power of different
generations may well underlie actual political decisionsJ In any case, our
purpose is to expose the kinds of inefficiencies that can result from
'In the U.S. the elderly, at least,are viewed as a powerful and active
political block. The AARP, the American Association of Retired Persons,
appears to have near veto power on social security legislation. Also, a new
group, AGE, Americans for Generational Equity, has arisen to look out for the
welfare of the young.—2—
generationally self—interested behavior, and a model of autonomous generations
seems a potentially useful means toward that end.
Research on inefficiencies arising from the combination of generational
selfishness and the sequential nature of generational interactions has a long
tradition in economics beginning with Samuelson's (1958) consumption—loan
model. This paper extends that literature by considering two additional
efficiency problems. The first is the prospect of factor monopolization by
successive generations. The second is the prospect of inefficient provision
of durable public goods. In addition to considering these issues, the paper
demonstrates that cooperative bargaining by coexisting generations is not, in
general, enough to overcome such inefficiencies.
In the simple, two—factor model of factor monopolization analyzed in
Section I, we show that each generation has an incentive to restrict its
supply of labor when young and its supply of capital when old (its saving when
young) in order to raise the respective market returns to these factors. The
government of each generation implements such factor monopolizations by
placing distortionary taxes on its members supplies of labor and savings.
The model's utility and production functions are Cobb—Douglas. Given these
functions and realistic parameter choices, the equilibrium wage taxes and
capital—incometaxes turn out to be quite high; indeed, they are high enough
to account for the level of distortionary wage and capital—income taxes in the
U.S. Our factor—monopolization explanation for distortionary taxation is
obviouslydifferent from the major alternative explanation in the literature
provided by Mirrless (1971) and Sadka (1976), namely that governments use
distortionary taxesto help sorttaxpayers of differing, but unobserved,
characteristics.—3—
In the analysis of nonexcludable durable public goods (bade) presented in
Section II, we show that changes in asset prices associated with the provision
of public goods—capitalization effects—can partly, fully, or more thanfully
offset the incentives of early generations to underprovide (overprovide)
public goods (bads). The capitalization effect we consider is associated with
the sale of land from one generation to the next. If the level of the public
good (bad) positively (negatively) affects the marginal utility of owning land
or housing, early generations will realize that increased provision of the
public good will raise the market values of their properties. In the case of
local durable public goods, capitalization incentives for providing these
goods can arise even if the level of the public good does not affect the
marginal utility of land. The reason is that, other things equal, a locality
that provides more durable public goods will be more attractive to new
residents (in our model new generations), and this added attraction will be
reflected in the locality's value of land. While the competition between
localities adds an additional element to the analysis, the special conditions
under which the provision of durable public goods is efficient are identical
in the cases of local and national (nonlocal) durable public goods.
In our models of factor monopolization and public goods provision, the
governments representing the respective generations play noncooperatively;
i.e., it is assumed that there is no mechanism through which they can make
binding agreements with each other. One might ask whether the inefficiencies
in these games are due solely to the noncooperative rules of play. In the
third section of the paper we present a simple model in which an older
generation, which lives in periods 1 and 2, and a younger generation, which
lives only in period 2, bargain cooperatively (i.e., with the ability to
establish binding contracts) in period 2. Notwithstanding their period 2-4-
cooperation, the older generation is able to "get the beat" on the younger
generation in its first period of life. "Getting the beat in this model
gives the older generation a better period—2 bargaining position, but also
leads to an inefficient solution; no matter what efficient, individually—
rational bargaining solution is used in period two, as long as it is correctly
forecast in period one, the resulting two—period consumption program is not
Pareto—optimal among the feasible allocations for the two—period economy. In
other words, because the two generations cannot bargain before the first—
period consumption occurs, an inefficiency results. This inefficiency is
solely due to the lack of synchronicity of the generations and therefore seems
inevitable in any intergenerational setting.
In the final section1 IV. we conclude the paper with some remarks about
the realism of generational models of government.
I. Factor Monopolization by Successive Generations
In this section we assume that each generation's government taxes its
members' labor and capital incomes, but returns the receipts from these taxes
to them in a lump sum. These distortionary taxes reduce each generation's
supplies of productive factors, thereby raising the market return to these
factors.
The framework is an infinite—horizon, overlapping—generations model. We
assumezero population growth, so that the number of young and old are equal
at eachpoint in time. All individuals within a generation are identical and
selfish, in that each cares only about his own consumption and leisure. The
members of each generation live for two periods. They supply labor whenyoung
and capital (their accumulated savings) when old. The utility function—5—
underlying these supply decisions is Cobb—Douglas in consumption whenyoung,
consumption when old, and leisure when young.
When each new generation arrives on the scene, its government,acting in
the interest of its members, announces a first—period labor—income tax anda
second—period tax on capital income. Given these taxes, the individual
members of each generation choose how much to work and consume whenyoung and
how much to save (invest) for old age. There are no bequests, so the old
consume the entire return on their savings.
Output at any point in time is produced according to a Cobb—Douglas
function of capital supplied by the old and labor supplied by the
contemporaneous young. The pre—tax returns earned by these factor supplies
are determined in competitive factor markets. Hence; while their governments
act strategically in setting tax rates, individuals in each generation simply
optimize subject to their after—tax budget constraints. This framework
captures the notion that each generation's government can collect taxes on
factor incomes, but cannot directly control any individual member's sale of
factors on the market.
Since each generation's supplies of labor when young and capital when old
are effectively determined by decisions made when the generation isyoung, the
government of each generation makes its moves when the generation is young.
Hence, the old generation's government does not act strategically; and the old
generation passively supplies all its accumulated capital to the production
sector and earns the market—determined return. The young generation, however,
needs to consider how its second—period supply of capital will influence the
supply of labor by the next generation. Thus, each new young generation finds
itself moving first in a subgame that it plays with the next generation and,
indirectly, with all other future generations.—6—
In setting its compensated taxes each government can effectively induce
its members to choose the point on their individual budget constraints that
the government desires, This fact permits us to simplify the analysis by
having the government choose directly the values of labor supply and
consumption that maximize its generation's utility, taking into account the
equilibrium effect on future generations. This planners problem differs,
however, from utility maximization by a representative individual because the
government planner takes into account the effect of its choices on factor
prices. We show later how the solution to the planning problem can be
decentralized through an appropriate set of proportional (and hence marginal)
taxes on labor and capital income which are rebated in a lump sum at the time
they are paid.
The utility of the typical member of the generation that isyoung at time
.Ut.is given by:
(1) Ut —
whereCyt. C041, and 2 are, respectively, consumption of the young at time
t, consumption of the old at time t+l, and leisure of the young at time t.
The budget constraining the present value of consumption of therepresentative
member of generation t is:
yt ot+l t+l t
In (2) R+1 and tJ stand, respectively, for the rental rates oncapital in
period t+l and labor in period t. We assume 100 percent depreciation of
capital during production; hence, C01 in (2) is divided byR+1 and not by
l+Rt+1. The price of the consumption good at each point in time is normalized—7—
to unity. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time when young; hence,
1- equals the individual's supply of labor.
Output per unit of labor at time t, is given by the Cobb—Douglas form
— where k stands for capital per unit of labor and where is
constant over time with OGC1. Competition in factor markets ensures that




Inchoosing i, generation Cs government takes into account that
depends on since W depends on k —K/(l—i).where Kt stands for capital
per old person at time t. In choosing C as well as generation t's
government also takes into account that R÷i depends on ki —Kt+1I(l—2+1)—
(Wt(l_it)—CytI/(l_it+i).The last equality reflects the fact that capital
per old person at time t+l equals the saving done when young at time t.










We can now state the planning problem of the government of generation t:







maximization generation t, whose members are young at time t, takes as given
the capital supplied by the old at time t.
In addition to taking account of the dependency of W and of Rt+i
on and C>,, generation t's government must consider how its choices of
these variables will influence the time—(t+l) labor supply chosen by
generation t+l. We hypothesize that since summarizes all relevant
information at time t+l, if depends on and Cyt. it depends on them
only through their effect on K÷1. We therefore study only subgame—perfect
equilibria in which strategic actions at t can depend on the history of play
only through K —sothat punishments, for example, are ruled out. In the
derivation of the optimal choices of and Cyt we further hypothesize that
the solution involves dt5/dK —0for all s>t. We then verify that this
hypothesis is consistent by showing that it implies d2t/dK—O. Both of these
hypotheses serve to focus attention on what we believe to be the interesting
equilibrium. Other equilibria can be expected to exist as well.
The maximization with respect to Cyt. C0t÷1, and of (I) subject to (2)






Equations (2), (4), and (5) can be solved for the optimal values of
Cyt
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From (8) we verify that d1/dKsO.
This solution can be decentralized with the government of generation t
instituting a wage tax at rate fi.acapital income tax at rate 1—fl, a first
period lump—stun payment equal to Wt(l_i)fl, and a second period lump—sum
payment M0÷i equal to (wt_it)Rt+i(l_fl). The individual's budget constraint
in this case is given by:
(9) Cyt + C0.1 (Rt+ifl) —W(l_P)1—' + +
TakingR+i, W1 and as given, the individual's maximization of (1)
subject to (9), leads to the first—order conditions (4) and (5). Since (9) is
equivalent to (2) given the definitions of and the individual's
demands for Cyt. C01. and 1t are those in (S)—(8).
In the U.S. capital's share of net national product is roughly 25
percent.2 If we use that value for $thesolution calls for a 25 percent tax
on labor income and a 75 percent taxoncapital income. The intuition behind
this solution is thatthefirst—order conditions involve the elasticity of
with respect to k+i and the elasticity of V with respect to k. The
2If one assumes that labor's share ofproprietorship income is the same
as its share of total net national product, then labor's 1989 share of net
national product is 72.6 percent. Source: Econo.ic Reoort of the President.
122Q.—10—
former elasticity equals fl—l, while the latter elasticity equals fi.Sincethe
interest rate is more elastic with respect to changes in relative factor
supplies than is the wage, it follows that the optimum includes & larger
distortion of saving than of labor supply.
We next compare (6) through (8) with their counterparts (10), (11), and
(12) below, which are the equilibrium values when no strategic behavior on the
part of generations is assumed.
(10) Cyt —Wl+:+b
b
(11) Cr41 —WR1 l+a+b
(12) 2t —l+a+b
Since $<l. 1 is larger when generations are strategic; hence, there is a
monopolization (reduction) of labor supply. Under strategic behavior saving
by the young at time t, Wt(l_lt)_Cyt equals Wt(1_fl)fib/[l+(l_$)(a+bfi)], while
it equals lJtb/(l+a+b) with no strategic behavior. It is easy to see that the
former quantity is less than the latter quantity. Thus, there is also a
monopolization of the supply of capital. While the supplies of labor and
capital are reduced by strategic behavior, consumption when young and old, Cyt
and C01, may be larger or smaller depending on parameter values.
To get an idea of the magnitude of factor monopolization, suppose a—l,
b—2, and fl—.25. For these parameters saving by the young equals half their
wages in the absence of monopolization. With monopolization saving by the
young equals less than a fifth of their wages. In addition, the labor
supplied by the young is almost 25 perc!nt smaller due to monopolization.—11—
While these results are based on our particularutility— and production—
function assumptions1 it appears that the strategicmanipulation of factor
supplies would arise for virtually all nicely behaved preferencesand
production technologies. It appears unlikely, however, thatone would be able
to derive closed—form solutions with assumptions thatare less specific than
those made here. The reason is that in equilibrium
dit/dkt is generally
nonzero, and its value will depend on all future values of this derivative.
Unless a consistent stationary pattern exists for thesederivatives, there is
no hope for an explicit solution.
To summarize, our model of factor monopolization by successive
generations delivers an explanation for distortionary taxation. The
particular Cobb—Douglas example suggests that generational factor
monopolization can account for quite high marginal tax rates as wellas
capital income taxes in excess of labor income taxes.
II. Inefficient Provision of Durable Public Goods
One of government's presumed functions is toovercome the inefficiencies
of laissez faire in the presence of economic externalities—for
example, the
free—rider problem associated with public goods. Somenonexcludable public
goods (such as highways) are durable enough to service multiplegenerations.
But if successive governments attend only to the selfish interestsof their
own generations and cannot force future generations topay part of the cost of
the public good, one might expect to observean underprovision of durable
public goods. A possible ameliorating factor is thatgenerations might be
able to recoup their investments in durablepublic goods if such investments
lead to higher values of land or otherassets. Such asset capitalization
might be of particular relevance in the case of durable localpublic goods$ —12—
since locational choice—the choice of where to buy or rent land andhousing—
is influenced by the availability of local public goods. -
Inthis section we explore twocapitalizationmodels. The first is a
"national" model in which the durable public good is available toanyone
owning land in the society. The second is a two—region model in which the
durable public good is available only to individuals owning land in theregion
(locality). Whilethecapitalization effects differ somewhat across the two
models, both models suggest an underprovision of durable publicgoods unless
there are strong utility complementarjtjes between publicgoods and land.
While there is an extra source of capitalization in thetwo—region model as
compared with the national model, it turns out that there is underprovision
(overprovision) at the symmetric equilibrium of the regional model if andonly
if there is underprovision (overprovision) at theequilibrium of the national
model.
Stiglitz (1983) also examines the provision of local public goods in
light of land—capitalization effects. His conclusion that landcapitalization
leads to an efficient provision of publicgoods hinges on his assumption that
each locality takes the utility level offeredby alternative localities as
given. In contrast, we assume that each locality takes the levelof taxation
and therefore the level of the publicgood provided by other localities as
given. Since in the simplest versions oflocal—public—goods models each
region offers the same level of utility in equilibrium, eachregion knows that
if it raises its utility level (attractivenessto new residents), the utility
levels of all other regions, no matter howmany and how large, adjust through
the process of individualsvoting with their feet,Accordingly, in our
model, we assume that each region takes the actions(tax rate and level of the
public good) of the other region asgiven, rather than the utility level in—13—
the other region, and assumes that prices will adjust in response to itsown
strategic move so as to equate utilities anew across the localities,
A. The National Model
To keep things as simple as possible, we assume that there are only two
periods and two generations. Only the early generation lives in the first
period, while the two generations coexist in the second period. There are
three goods: a public good, a private consumption good, and land. Each of the
n identical members of the early generation is endowed with one unit of the
private good and one unit of land. Private goods not consumed can be used to
produce public goods in the first period only. The technology is simple; one
unit of the private good is sufficient to generate one unit of the public
good. The public good does not depreciate and is non—excludable. The private
good is storable with no depreciation or appreciation across the two periods.
To focus on the essential issues, we assume that the members of the early
generation gain no direct benefit from the public good, so that none will be
provided absent some compensation mechanism. The utility function of the
typical member of the early generation is u(c1,c2) —c1+c2,where c is
consumption of the private good in period t(t—l,2).In addition to any
savings, second—period consumption comes from the sale of land to the later
generation, whose n identical members are endowed only with one unit of the
consumption good in the second period and whose utility functions are given by
w(c,s,q), where c is consumption of the private good, a is the amount of land
purchased, and q is the quantity of public good that has been provided in the
first period.
The land market is competitive: if the price of land relative to the
private good is p, the typical second—generation member's budget constraint is—14—
c+ps —1,and the first—order condition for his utility maximization problem
is
(13) —p w1(1—sp,s,q) +w2(l—sp,s,q)
—0,
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives in (13) and below where obvious.
Land is assumed to be supplied inelastf.cally (the first generation's
government cannot strategically confiscate land to drive up its price); so at




Recognizing the dependence of p on q, the first generation's government can
levy a tax of r per capita on its members and use it to produce nr units of
the public good.3 The budget constraint of each member of the first
generation is then c1 +c2—1+p—r.Since utility of the first generation
also equals c1 +c2,the government of the first generation chooses T to
maximize 1 +p(v)—r,where p(v) is defined by (14) for q—n. Thus the
first—order condition for the provision of the durable public good in this
problem is dp/dt —1,or
(15) — + nw1w23—
mt2w13+W2Wfl — — 0.
Equation (15) may be compared with the efficiency (Samuelson's) condition
(16) —Wi+ nw3—0.
3The second—generation'sgovernment is assumed to play no role in this
model.—15—
Equations (15) and (16) are not the same, and, except in very special
circumstances, the strategically—acting first—generation government will not
supply an efficient amount of the public good. For example, if the function w
is separable in its three arguments, the price of land in (13) will not depend
on the level of the public good; so the first generation will provide none of
the public good (a corner solution so (15) does not hold). At the other
extreme, we can have a corner solution with r—l if the ten w23 is
sufficiently large. Since w23 does not appear in (16) it is not hard to
construct examples in which equilibrium involves overprovision of the durable
public good.
B. The Re2ional Model
Now suppose that there are two localities, a and p.eachwith a first
generation of n members as specified above, and suppose that the public good's
benefits accrue only to those in the second generation (of size 2n) who live
in the locality where it is provided. Second—generation members may purchase
land and live in either locality, but not in both. Let na andnp stand,
respectively, for the number of second—generation members locating in regions
a and fi;sona +np
—2n.Let 5a stand for the amount of land purchased by a
second—generation member locating in region a. In equilibrium s —n/na.
Hence, by analogy with equation (13), the equilibrium prices a and Pp of land
in localities a and ,respectively,satisfy—16—
w2(l— --p,—--,nr)
(17) p — 0
w(1— —p—.nr ) 1n a it a a a




w(l— p. ,nr) 1 2n—n ft2n—n B a a
where and are the respective taxes. At an interior equilibrium the
second—generation members must be indifferent between locating in either
locality, hence,
n n n n (19) w(l— —p •—, itt)— w(1— p •—. nr). na n a 2n—nft 2n—n ft a a a a
Equations (17) and (18) implicitly define functions pa_pa(na,ra) and
These can be substituted into equation (19), with the result
being an expression for n as a function n9rar,) of the tax rates.
We now assume that the two first—generation governments choose their
respective tax rates as simultaneous moves in a noncooperative game. Recall
that the utility of the typical first—generation resident of region A is
1 + — Ta—1+P2(n0(ra.rp).ra)
—
Ta•Differentiating this expression
with respect to the strategic variable and equating to zero yields
a a a
(20)
A comparison of equations (20) and (16) indicates that an interior symmetric
equilibrium will be efficient only if the left—hand side of (20) equals
nh/w'?, where wi stands for the the ith partial derivative of w evaluated
as in the left—hand side of (19). Differentiating (19) with respect to—17—
substituting (17) and (18) in the result, evaluating at the symmetric
equilibrium where naan and (19) holds, and simplifying yields4:
anw a a a 3 $ a (21) p1n1+p2 ——+p1n1.
Wi
Since the right—hand side of (21) differs generally from ni/wi, the
provision of durable local public goods will not, in general, satisfy the
efficiency condition. Solving (21) for ni and substituting the resulting






using the fact that in the symmetric equilibrium t a
—pf.Note that if
p9 —ni/wi,we have from (22) that ni/wi a1,which is the efficiency
condition. But the conditions under which p9 —ni/wiare simply those
required for efficiency in the national model. In addition underprovision
(overprovision) occurs exactly under the same circumstances in both models.
Since (15) indicated no reason to expect efficient provision of the
public good in the national model, there is no reason to expect efficient
provision of the public good in the regional model. The regional model,
however, appears to deliver more of the public good than the national model in
certain interesting cases. Consider, for example, the case of separable
utility. In this case p9 —0and, while there will be no public goods
provided in the national model, a positive, but less than efficient level of
the public good will be provided in the regional modil.
'It is easy to see that this same expression arises regardless of the
relative size of the two regions. Hence, even if one region is tiny relative
to the rest of the country, this relationship will hold,—18—
III.InefficLencles in Intergenerational Bargaining
So far, all the inefficiencies in this paper have been associated with
equilibria of intergenerational noncooperative games. In this section we
exhibit an inefficiency arising in the context of an intergenerational
cooperative bargaining model. At first glance this seems paradoxical, since
the solution concepts of cooperative—game theory typically aásume Pareto
optimality. The resolution of the seeming paradox is that although the
analysis assumes that the generations bargain to an efficient solution, this
bargaining can only take place once the generations coexist. When one
generation precedes another prior to an overlapping era, there are times
before the existence of the later generation when the members of the earlier
generation take actions that have economic consequences, and these economic
consequences, in turn, affect the initial positions in the bargaining game.5
Thus the earlier generation has incentives to take actions strategically
before the bargaining begins so that it will be better positioned for the
bargaining game, even though the strategic actions may cause an inefficiency.
(In this sense, the inefficiency results from noncooperative aspects of the
rules of the game.)
On one level, the result is no surprise; for instance, if the efficient
allocations all involved the earlier generation investing in some durable
public good, which it would not do by itself, the absence of the later
generation during the efficient investment time period means that the earlier
generation can extract no quid pro quo and therefore will not find it in its
interest to undertake the investment. What isperhaps surprising is that the
Of course, if thegenerations do not overlap at all, they cannot ever
bargain.—19—
same effect can be obtained without public goods, in fact without production
at all. All that is necessary is an intertemporal consumption
complementarity.
We exhibit a simple example in which all cooperative bargaining solutions
(i.e., solutions for the Nash bargaining problem) satisfying minimal
assumptions give rise to the inefficiency. There are twoplayers
(generations)—A and B. As in the previous section, player A lives for two
periods, while B lives only in the second period. There are twogoods—Xand
Y. A is endowed with one unit of good X in the first period, any part of
which can be consumed then, with the rest stored for consumption or exchange
(or some of each) in the second period. B is endowed with one unit of good '1
(in the second period, of course), which can be consumed and/or exchanged
then. Denoting A's consumption of X in the two periods by x and x2A.
respectively, and A's consumption of Y in the second period by y, we take A's
utility of consumption to be
(23) u(x1.x2.y) —(xlAxY"2 + y
B's utility for consumption is taken to be
(24) u3(x3,y8) —XB
+
where xB and are B's consumption of X and Y, respectively, in the second
period. Feasibility requires
(25) x + xTh + xB —1, + —1,and nonnegativity of all variables.
Individualrationality cx anterequiresthattheconsumptions satisfy
(26) u(x.x.y) 1/2 and u3(x8,y3) t 1,—20—
sinceA can assure himself utility of 1/2 by consuming the vector (1/2,1/2,0)
without trade, and B can assure 1 by consuming (0,1) without trade. The
utilities that result from all the allocations that are both individually
rational and ex ante Pareto optimal are ((z, 2 —z):1/2z S 1) obtained by
A consuming z ￿1/2units of good '1 and B consuming all of good X and (l—z)
units of good Y.
The bargaininggame begins after X1A is consumed, so fixing x—A,the
threatlevelsof utility in the bargaining game are (A(l-.A))V2 and 1, for the
two players respectively, and the cx post individually—rational and Pareto
optimal bargains are obtained by maximizing
(27) +ysubject to (I) +(l_A_x2A)
—constant
and nonnegativity constraints. The solutions all involve
(28) —mm(A/4, 1—A).
If A—O, the bargaining problem is simply one of sharing one unit of surplus,
since Player A's threat level of utility is zero, Player B's is one, and the
extra unit of surplus can be split unrestrictedly between them. All serious
solutions to this Nash bargaining problem involve a 1/2—1/2 split of the
surplus, bringing Player A back to his ex—ante individual—rationality bound.
If A>O, any solution to the bargaining game is ex—ante inefficient, so it only
remains to show that under any bargaining solution, Player A is better off
setting A>O and then bargaining rather than setting A—O and settling for the
utility of 1/2 he could have earned by ignoring the later generation. Of
course, the optimal value of A for Player A depends on the specific bargaining
solution to be employed, but it is easy to see that by setting A —1/2Player—21—
A guarantees that he receives utility more than 1/2 unless thebargaining
solution is completely unresponsive to him, to see this1 note thatif —1/2
and x2A is set to 1/8 (see above) the sum of the two utilities is
1/4 +3/8+1> 3/2. Since the threat utilities sum to 3/2 (1/2 and 1,
respectively), there is surplus to be shared, and, so long as A gets some of
it (as all solutions to Nash's bargaining problem prescribe), theargument is
complete.
One lesson from this example is that a potential cx ante inefficiency
arises from the simple fact that all generations cannot be present at the
beginning of time to bargain, or indeed at any time in which there are
efficiency gains to be had from coordinated action. A second lesson is that
the coordinated actions can range from the fairly obvious case of production
of a durable public good linked to a subsequent transfer as quidpro quo at
one extreme, to the (perhaps) less obvious case of pure exchange when there
are intertemporal consumption complementarities at another extreme.
IV. Conclusion
This paper develops some implications of selfish generational behavior.
Its message is pessimistic. In seeking their own advantages, generations are
likely to monopolize their factor supplies, provide inefficient levels of
durable public goods, and act strategically in producing or consuming private
goods. One can think of additional inefficiencies associated with the
sequential nature of generational exchange, such as inefficient risk sharing.
If the implications of representative generational government are
pessimistic, are they realistic? After all, one does not observe separate
elections for different age groups. We argue that the decisions made by
observed political institutions should often mimic those that would be made by—22—
representatives of different generations. Consider, for example, the
monopolization of factor supplies. If elected officials know that young
constituent workers favor compensated wage and capital—income taxes and that
their older constituents are indifferent to the perpetuation of such
compensated taxes, they will, presumably, enact such taxes. Elected
politicians might also emulate the behavior of generational governments in
cases of conflict between different contemporaneous generations. If the
elderly favor policy x, while the young favor policy y, and policy z would be
the equlibrium outcome determined with generational representation, a typical
politician might choose policy z because he realizes that any other choice of
policy would lead to the emergence of candidates for his office appealing to
particular age groups. Alternatively, failure to adopt z could lead the age
group that fared less well than under policy z to withdraw support for the
politician,
One way out of generational inefficiencies of the sort considered here is
to hypothesize an infinite horizon and an equilibrium in which generations
punish their elders if the elders fail to provide a quid pro quo (or fail to
punish an earlier generation for failing to provide a quid pro quo, or ...) as
in Kotlikoff, Persson, and Svensson (1988). This seems implausible, somehow.
Another way out is to assume that intergenerational altruism is built into the
collective human psyche. While we certainly observe altruistic behavior in
everyday life that seems almost instinctive (Frank [1988]). recent empirical
research (e.g., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 119891) suggests that observed
altruistic behavior is far from the Becker (1974)—Barro (1974) perfect
intergenerational altruism needed to overcome the efficiency problems raised
here, It seems likely therefore that the intergenerational inefficiencies
described here arise to some degree.—23—
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